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Abstract
The Review of Public Administration in Northern Ireland was heralded at its
launch in 2002 by the then First Minister as an opportunity to put in place ‘a
modern, accountable, effective system of public administration that can
deliver a high quality set of public services’. Some ten years on, it remains a
work in progress. The process of reform became enmeshed in the on-off
pattern of devolution, at which point direct rule ministers in the Northern
Ireland Office assumed control and reached ‘final’ decisions in 2006 to
radically restructure local government, education, health and other public
bodies. With the restoration of devolution, local ministers felt no sense of
ownership of the reforms and made significant changes. What started out as a
rational exercise in administrative reform became mired in party politics and
is unlikely to complete until 2015.
Keywords: Public administration, Northern Ireland, local government,
education, health, public bodies  
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Introduction
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland is
directly linked to the devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive in December 1999 as a result of the Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement, 1998. Prior to devolution, six government
departments were responsible to direct rule/Westminster ministers,
whose major preoccupations were security and constitutional issues,
leaving senior civil servants to administer key public services in a
largely unaccountable way. These circumstances resulted directly from
wider political developments that led to the prorogation of the local
parliament (Stormont) in March 1972. One of the underlying factors
behind the protests that characterised the early period of the conflict
in Northern Ireland was discontent with public services among the
nationalist population. The early 1970s, for example, witnessed the
civil rights movement demand major reforms in local government in
order to address Unionist hegemony asserted through gerrymandered
electoral wards, restricted franchise and discriminatory housing
practices (Birrell & Murie, 1980; O’Dowd et al., 1980). Reforms came
in the shape of the Macrory report (Government of Northern Ireland,
1970), which divided services into regional (Stormont) and district
administrative units (local authorities). Macrory’s proposals were,
however, overtaken by political events and the implementation of
direct rule from Westminster. In the absence of a regional tier at
Stormont, what emerged was an emasculated form of local
government and key public services delivered through a highly
centralised system of public administration (Knox, 1999). Direct rule
witnessed ad hoc reforms to public sector structures and a hugely
bureaucratic response to the delivery of basic public services. 
With devolution, the six pre-existing government departments
responsible for public services under direct rule reconfigured and
expanded to ten departments, with an additional department – the
Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) –
to manage the programme for government and the agenda of the new
executive. In April 2010 another department, the Department of
Justice, was added as a direct result of the devolution of policing and
justice powers (the so-called final piece of the devolution jigsaw),
making a total of twelve government departments. In 2011–12 the
total expenditure on devolved public services amounts to £10.3 billion,
and the public sector employs 31 per cent of the workforce in
Northern Ireland, or around 214,000 people (Department of Trade
and Investment, 2012).
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The restructuring of departments had no administrative logic, but
was the outcome of political negotiations between the main political
parties (mostly the Ulster Unionists and the SDLP), who agreed that
the Northern Ireland Executive should comprise twelve ministers: six
Unionists and six nationalists. The creation of the Northern Ireland
Assembly and a regional tier of government added to an already
congested political landscape, which now features 3 MEPs, 18 MPs,
108 MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly) and 582 local
councillors for a population of 1.8 million people. In addition, a
complex mosaic of government departments, agencies, local
authorities, non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), quangos,
boards and trusts constitute the public sector. This prompted criticism
from the Comptroller and Auditor General, who described the public
administration system in Northern Ireland as ‘disastrously
fragmented’. Almost every public body in Great Britain that carries
out any function of government, he argued, ‘is duplicated on a tiny
scale within Northern Ireland and that is an impediment to clarity and
an enormous inefficiency’ (Dowdall, 2004, p. 21). 
Devolution impelled an examination of the overall architecture of
government. The (then) First Minister of the Northern Ireland
Assembly announced that one of the major tasks facing the devolved
executive was public administration reform, something that he saw as
central to the way public services would be structured, organised and
delivered in the future. This was an opportunity, he argued, ‘to put in
place a modern, accountable, effective system of public administration
that can deliver a high quality set of public services to our citizens’
(Trimble, 2002, p. 5). This paper examines the reform of public
administration in Northern Ireland since its inception and the tortuous
process towards implementation, yet to be completed, and assesses its
impact against the original goals to date.
The review process
The Review of Public Administration (RPA) was launched in June
2002, and its terms of reference reflected the need to restructure the
administrative architecture within a devolved system of government as
follows:
To review the existing arrangements for the accountability,
administration and delivery of public services in Northern Ireland,
and to bring forward options for reform which are consistent with
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the arrangements and principles of the Belfast Agreement, within
an appropriate framework of political and financial accountability.
(Northern Ireland Executive, 2005, p. 138) 
Under the original timescale for the review, a final set of
recommendations should have been reached by the end of 2003.
Almost ten years on, it remains a work in progress. 
In general, the announcement of the review was welcomed by local
politicians, many of who had been frustrated in their role as local
councillors by what they perceived as unaccountable public officials
operating under direct rule circumstances. The scope of the review,
however, attracted criticism in that its terms of reference excluded
government departments established by the Belfast (Good Friday)
Agreement. The official position was that while the review was likely
to have implications for the functions exercised by the executive, the
institutions and the divisions of functions between the departments
were not part of the review’s remit. The inclusion of government
departments was rejected on the grounds that the review should not be
used as a way of renegotiating the agreement ‘by the back door’. The
rationale was simple, albeit bizarre, from a purely administrative
perspective: with devolution so precarious (and so it proved to be until
2007), nothing could be allowed to endanger its fragile continuance.
With the exclusion of government departments, the parameters of the
review were restricted to an examination of health, education, local
government and quangos. Aside from local government, which is
devoid of major functional responsibilities in Northern Ireland, large
spending bodies in health, education and social housing came within
the review’s remit (some 140 organisations) – a popular decision
because these functions sat within a governance structure that largely
comprised ministerial appointees, or ‘quangocrats’, and therefore
lacked democratic accountability. 
Aside from the parameters of the review, its conduct attracted
criticism because it was carried out by a group of civil servants based
in the OFMDFM, supported by a panel of independent experts ‘in the
fields of governance and organisational change’ (Northern Ireland
Executive, 2005, pp. 9, 145). Characterising civil servants as ‘budget
maximising bureaucrats’ (Dunleavy, 1991) in a rhetorical question,
one politician asked, ‘officials will have a vested interest in keeping
their own administrative empires going – who has ever heard of a civil
servant who has been anxious to reduce the number beneath him [sic]
in the pyramid?’ (McCartney, 2002, p. 14). 
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The original expectations at the launch of the review were quickly
dampened when the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended in
October 2002 and the RPA became the responsibility of British (direct
rule) ministers, who were determined not to act as mere caretakers. In
fact, the British minister with responsibility for the RPA set the
benchmark against which its success can be judged when he
commented, ‘improving services to the public lies at the heart of any
new model of public administration’ (Pearson, 2004, p. 2). There was
an acknowledgement that the ‘reform process is not an end in itself
and is only of value if it results in measurably better services for the
public that deliver real value for money’ (OFMDFM, 2004, p. 89).
The review process was thorough, underpinned by widespread
consultation and a large body of empirical evidence, which included
six probability sample attitudinal surveys covering Northern Ireland;
consultation focus groups with over seventy organisations affected by
the review; international study visits to consider how public services
were organised in other countries; comprehensive mapping of the
public sector; commissioned academic briefing papers on key issues;
and two major public consultation exercises, which asked the public to
respond to emerging findings (Knox, 2008). Central to the
consultation proposals was a two-tier model of public administration.
The first tier would be a regional tier encompassing the assembly,
government departments and regional authorities, the focus of which
would be developing policy, setting standards and delivering regional
services. The second tier, a subregional tier, would encompass
organisations that ideally operate within common boundaries, to
include councils, health bodies, subregional bodies and delivery units
of regional bodies. The model assumed delivery at the subregional tier
(subsidiarity) unless economies of scale (or other factors) dictated
delivery on a regional basis (see Figure 1). 
Northern Ireland Office Minister (at the time) Ian Pearson offered
his views on the ‘final’ reform model as follows:
I envisage the Assembly with departments sitting at regional level
with responsibility for policy, strategic planning, setting standards
and monitoring performance. At local level, larger, more powerful
councils could have responsibilities for an increased range of
functions … I will also be examining the scope for significant
reductions in the number of public bodies, in particular, the
administrative structures around health and education. (Pearson,
2004, p. 1)
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The ‘final’ decisions of the RPA announced by the (then) Northern
Ireland Secretary of State, Peter Hain, were contained in the
document Better government for Northern Ireland. Hain pointed out
that ‘ideally local politicians in a local Assembly should be taking
decisions on all the key issues affecting the people of Northern
Ireland’. In the absence of devolved government (at that time), the
outcomes of the review were to ensure that ‘taxpayers will get better
value for money through the savings made in reducing bureaucracy
being redirected to front-line services’ (Northern Ireland Executive,
122 COLIN KNOX
Figure 1: Two-tier model of public administration
Source: Northern Ireland Executive (2005, p. 22).
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2006, p. 3). The savings from the review (based on certain assumptions
around its implementation) were estimated at £200 million per year
(Deloitte, 2006). The reforms included the reduction in the number of
local councils from twenty-six to seven, the establishment of a new
Education and Skills Authority (ESA), and the replacement of four
existing health and social services boards by a Health and Social
Services Authority (more details below).
The restoration of devolution and the establishment of a power-
sharing executive in May 2007 witnessed local political parties revisit
the outcomes of the review. Former Health Minister Michael
McGimpsey claimed in a memo to his staff that ‘the Review of Public
Administration is not my plan, as I was not involved in the decisions
taken under Direct Rule’ (McGimpsey, 2007, p. 1). Former Education
Minister Caitríona Ruane stated that ‘the Review of Public
Administration project in education is too big and complex’ to try to
implement in the planned timescale (Ruane, 2007, p. 2). She therefore
agreed, with the endorsement of the Northern Ireland Executive, to
postpone setting up the new ESA by up to one year. Former
Environment Minister Arlene Foster announced a new review of
structural and functional reforms in local government – a ‘review of
the review’, if you will. In summary, Northern Ireland ministers were
keen to distance themselves somewhat from the RPA decisions of their
British predecessors. 
The outcomes
The ‘final’ decisions from the RPA reached by the devolved
administration (Northern Ireland Executive, 2006) are now
summarised.
Local government
● The number of councils will reduce from twenty-six to eleven by
May 2011. The Local Government Boundaries Commissioner
submitted his recommendations to the Department of the
Environment on the new boundaries in June 2009. 
● Councils will have a statutory duty to lead a community planning
process, and all other agencies must work with the councils.
Councils will also be given the power of well-being. 
● A range of functions will transfer to local government including
aspects of planning, rural development, the public realm aspects of
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local roads functions, urban regeneration and community
development, a range of housing-related functions and local
economic development and tourism.
Education
● The ESA will replace the current five education and library boards
by January 2010, and take over the functions currently carried out
by the education and library boards, the Council for the Curriculum
Examinations and Assessment, and the Regional Training Unit. It
will also be responsible for the front-line support currently
undertaken by the Council for Catholic Maintained Schools, the
Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education and Comhairle
na Gaelscolaíochta (Irish schools). 
● The ESA will absorb the role of the Education Staff Commission,
which dealt with recruitment, training, and terms and conditions of
employment of officers of the education and library boards. It will
also undertake some of the functions currently performed by the
Department of Education.
● The Youth Council will come under the ESA, as will youth services
administration.
● A new statutory Advisory Forum will be established as a major
source of advice between education sectors and the Department of
Education.
Health
● The eighteen health trusts were reduced to five, and have been fully
operational since April 2007 (the Ambulance Service remains as a
separate trust).
● Four new organisations were established in April 2009: 
– a single Health and Social Care Board, replacing the existing
four health and social services boards, and focusing on
commissioning, resource management, and performance
management and improvement; 
– a Public Health Agency, incorporating and building on the
work of the Health Promotion Agency but with a much wider
responsibility for health protection, health improvement and
development to address existing health inequalities and public
health issues for all the people of Northern Ireland;
– a Business Services Organisation, providing a range of
support functions for the whole of the health and social care
system (the Central Services Agency was dissolved and the
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majority of its services were incorporated into the new
organisation);
– a single Patient and Client Council, which replaced the health
and social services councils with five local offices operating in
the same geographical areas as the existing trusts, to provide
a strong voice for patients, clients and carers.
Other public bodies1
● In order to streamline public administration, clarify accountability
and ensure public services are easily accessible and customer-
focused, the number of these bodies will decrease from eighty-one
to fifty-three. This will be achieved, in the main, by merging bodies
or transferring complete functions to local government or central
government. Many of the remaining bodies will have reduced
responsibilities through the transfer of some of their functions to
local government.
It is clear from the above outcomes that the review focused on
structural reforms, the reorganisation of the machinery of governance.
It also became synonymous with the devolution process and was
influenced by party political considerations rather than a focus on
improving public services. Government ministers operating under
devolution did not want to simply accept the decisions of a process
presided over by ‘direct rulers’. In an overview of the outcomes of the
RPA, Birrell argued that:
The reforms represent a reduction in the number of existing
organisations and some reconfiguration of functions, as well as
demonstrating an institutionalist and somewhat traditional
approach focused on existing traditional sectors and institutions …
In practice, the final outcome consists of a package of disparate
changes, representing a number of influences, streamlining of
structures, cost cutting, and enhancing the functions for local
government, but also of increased centralisation of other functions.
(Birrell, 2008, p. 781)
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1 A public body is not part of a government department, but carries out its functions to
a greater or lesser extent at ‘arms length’ from central government. The term ‘public
body’ is a general one, which includes NDPBs, public corporations, and health and
social care bodies/special agencies. NDPBs are the most common public bodies.
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Importantly, however, almost ten years on from its inception, the
review remains largely incomplete. Local government reorganisation
has yet to happen, the ESA is not in place, reforms in the health
service (the only sector that has implemented the RPA reforms) have
been criticised and the number of ‘other public bodies’ has actually
increased. We now consider progress against the ‘final’ decisions of the
RPA and its impact against the original goal: ‘measurably better
services for the public that deliver real value for money’. 
Implementation 
Local government 
Local government reform was hailed as one of the key components in
the review. Given its relatively minor role in delivering public services
and associated spending (some 5 per cent of the public budget), the
key recommendations were to reduce the number of councils from
twenty-six to eleven, with increased powers for local government. At
an earlier stage in the reform process, when devolution was
suspended, British ministers sought to impose a seven ‘super-council’
model, which failed to achieve local political support. This was seen as
part of a wider strategy by the British Government to create
momentum for political progress, which helped lead to the St Andrews
Agreement (October 2006). Strong local government was agreed as
one of the key principles underpinning the review. What have
emerged, however, are a small number of additional functions added
to the limited portfolio of local services currently delivered by
councils. Indeed, senior officials in local government have suggested
that what is on offer are those services which central government no
longer want, and will be transferred to councils without proper funding
in place, such as local roads. To compensate for limited functional
responsibilities, councils will be given mandatory community planning
and well-being powers, although the detail has yet to be agreed. This
will allow councils to hold to account those statutory bodies that
deliver public services in their areas (government departments, health
trusts, agencies and quangos) through a community plan. While this
offers the potential for councils to exercise leverage without direct
functional responsibility, it remains to be seen just how influential
local government can be when faced with large recalcitrant public
bodies that default on their local commitments (Knox, 2010).
Notwithstanding discussions about the future role of local
government, the other concern is why there are still twenty-six district
126 COLIN KNOX
07 Knox article_Admin 60-1  14/05/2012  17:55  Page 126
councils when reorganisation should have been completed by May
2011? Local government reform, in fact, illustrates the hugely political
nature of the RPA, which has moved some distance from its 
original brief to examine arrangements for the ‘accountability,
administration and delivery of public services in Northern Ireland’ to
a process that became embroiled in sectarian politics. In March 2008
the Northern Ireland Executive agreed to cut the twenty-six district
councils to eleven and promoted the decision as proof that the DUP
and Sinn Féin could reach agreement on a key public policy reform.
Up to that point the programme of local government reform had cost
£5.5 million with no outcomes. The (then) Minister of the
Environment, based on an economic appraisal, predicted savings of
more than £400 million over a period of twenty-five years by moving
to the eleven-council model (Department of the Environment, 2009).
To make this happen, local government boundaries had to be agreed
and in place for elections to the new councils in May 2011. Proposals
from the independent Local Government Boundaries Commissioner
were disputed by the (then) DUP Department of Environment
Minister, Edwin Poots, who had direct responsibility for councils.
Specifically, Minister Poots opposed proposals for Dunmurry – a
district electoral area within Lisburn City Council, where he was also
an elected councillor – to transfer into adjoining Belfast City Council. 
There are two explanations for the minister’s intervention. The
minister claimed that some 60,000 residents of Dunmurry wanted to
remain part of Lisburn City Council rather than Belfast, where council
rates (local property tax) were higher, and that their views had not
been heard by the Boundaries Commissioner. The second explanation
came from Sinn Féin, who accused the minister of attempting to
gerrymander boundaries, of an unprecedented move to unilaterally
change proposals from the Boundaries Commissioner and of a conflict
of interest in his roles as a minister with responsibility for local
government and also as a councillor in the area under dispute (Butler,
2010). Deadlock ensued between the DUP and Sinn Féin over the
issue, and the commissioner’s proposals for local government
boundaries could not be agreed by the Northern Ireland Executive.
The minister’s opposition effectively scuppered plans for local
government reorganisation, and elections took place to the twenty-six
existing councils in May 2011 (at the same time as the Northern
Ireland Assembly elections), with plans for new structures now
postponed to 2015.
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Education 
Education reforms are no less controversial. The education policy
landscape is one of declining school enrolments, overprovision of
school places, a parallel system of controlled (Protestant) and
maintained (Catholic) schools resulting in duplicated services, and a
decrease in the education budget. In short, the current system of
education provision is simply unsustainable, with the minister claiming
there are 85,000 empty desks in schools (O’Dowd, 2011, p. 3). The
decision of the RPA to establish the ESA was seen as a key mechanism
to rationalise the plethora of education quangos, plan in a unified way
the future education estate and save £20 million per year in so doing.
The ESA is not yet in place despite an implementation team working
on its formation since 2005 at a cost of £11.5 million (Clarke, 2011).
All political parties supported the establishment of the ESA, but it
became part of a series of disputes between the former Sinn Féin
Education Minister Caitríona Ruane and the statutory education
oversight committee in the assembly. She attracted significant
controversy in her trenchant views on, inter alia, academic selection
(the 11-plus debate), the establishment of the ESA and the promotion
of, and support for, Irish language schools. Unionist politicians lost
confidence in her, and she failed to secure executive approval on key
policy changes. 
On the specific issue of setting up the ESA, the Protestant churches,
which had handed over their schools to state control in the 1920s
(‘transferors’), felt they were not adequately represented on the
proposed new body. The new Education Minister, John O’Dowd (Sinn
Féin), has adopted a more conciliatory approach by trying to build
consensus with education stakeholders and has cultivated a good
working relationship with the education committee in the assembly,
and there are now plans to establish the ESA. The minister brokered
agreement on its structure by giving the churches (Protestant
transferors and Catholic trustees) greater representation to secure
their full cooperation. Legislation will be introduced by 2013, the eight
bodies that currently control education will be wound up in 2014 and
the ESA will be fully functional in 2015, some thirteen years on from
the RPA’s launch. The proposed constitution of the ESA Board will be
eight church representatives, eight political representatives (allocated
through the d’Hondt method, where parties choose ministries
according to their electoral strength) and four appointees chosen by
the Education Minister. In other words, the existing education
quangos, so often criticised for lack of political accountability, will be
replaced by a super-quango.
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Health 
The health and social care sector in Northern Ireland is the largest
public service, accounting for £4.4 billion of public expenditure per
year. The RPA was the culmination of a series of reforms already in
train at that time, and hence health as a functional area was able to
respond quicker to the requirements for change than other sectors.
The aims of the RPA reforms in health and social care were to reduce
costs, create better-quality and safer services through improved
governance and assurance arrangements, streamline the number of
bodies, target health and well-being, and reduce health inequalities
(McGimpsey, 2008). In a recent review of the health and social care
sector, the Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland
assessed the outcomes of the RPA against some of the original claims.
Health and social care bodies were set a target to achieve £53 million
in efficiency savings by 2010–11 under the RPA reforms. The largest
element of these savings was expected to come from the reduction of
eighteen health trusts to five in order to realise cost savings of £39
million. Other health and social care bodies – the Health and Social
Care Board, Public Health Agency, Business Services Organisation,
and the Patient and Client Council – were expected to achieve the
remaining efficiencies. The Department of Health, Social Services and
Public Safety, using its own financial data, showed a shortfall in savings
of over £4 million, which it claims will be achieved through shared
services in 2012–13. Alongside this, the Comptroller and Auditor
General reported that he ‘would have expected greater savings in
management and administration costs across the health and social
care sector’ (Northern Ireland Audit Office, 2011, p. 4). He also noted
that operational performance against most measures, such as waiting
times for inpatient treatment, outpatient appointments, diagnostic
tests and emergency care, had declined considerably since March
2009. 
The Audit Office evaluation was hardly a ringing endorsement of
the RPA. In fact, the RPA has since been superseded by yet another
review of health and social care in Northern Ireland (the so-called
Compton review). The Chief Executive of the Health and Social Care
Board, John Compton, and a small independent team were tasked by
the Health Minister to provide ‘a strategic assessment across all
aspects of health and social care services, examining the present
quality and accessibility of services, and the extent to which patients,
clients, carers and communities are being met’ (Department of
Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2011, p. 3). The review was
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asked to bring forward proposals for the future shape of services and
provide an implementation plan covering a five-year period. Structural
reforms recommended by the review team, which reported in
December 2011, included a reduction in the number of hospitals from
ten acute hospitals to between five and seven hospital networks, a shift
of resources from hospitals to enable investment in community health
and social care services, and the closure of long-stay institutions in
learning disability and mental health, with more impetus given to
developing communities services for these groups. The recommended
changes suggested a shift of £83 million from current hospital spend
and its reinvestment into primary, community and social care services,
and £70 million transitional funding for the new model of service to be
implemented. Less than five years beyond the implementation of the
RPA, the results of which received a mixed report from the
Comptroller and Auditor General, another review recommending
fundamental changes is currently with the Health Minister.
Other public bodies
Much criticism had been directed at the number of NDPBs that
existed in Northern Ireland during the direct rule era (Greer, 1999;
Meehan, 1997). These quangos had been a way of extracting public
functions from a system characterised by partisan political clientelism
and placing them in unelected boards and trusts with direct
accountability to the minister. NDPBs were frequently cited as
examples of the worst features of direct rule, in particular because of
the appointment process and its propensity for cronyism – a cadre of
the same people were represented on several quangos, referred to in
a derisory way as quangocrats. Although an exact comparison is
difficult to make because of the way in which public bodies are
categorised, Table 1 shows the pre- and post-RPA statistics for ‘other
public bodies’. The target for the RPA was to reduce the number of
these bodies from eighty-one to fifty-three but, in fact, the statistics
show there has been an increase to eighty-nine ‘other public bodies’.
The so-called ‘bonfire of quangos’ has turned into a damp squib. 
The recently completed Draft programme for government 2011–15
makes no further commitments to ‘delivering high quality and efficient
public services’ beyond establishing the eleven-council model for local
government by 2015 and forming the ESA in 2013 (Northern Ireland
Executive, 2011, p. 52). That said, it has become a political expedient
to axe one of the current twelve government departments. When the
newly created Department of Justice was formed in April 2010,
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following devolution of policing and criminal justice functions to the
Northern Ireland Assembly, a compromise deal was agreed between
the DUP and Sinn Féin whereby Alliance leader David Ford was
elected on a cross-party vote as Minister of Justice rather than via the
d’Hondt mechanism. This arrangement created an anomaly in that the
Alliance Party held two ministries with fewer seats than the Ulster
Unionists and SDLP (with one ministry each). This agreement is due
to run out in May 2012 under a ‘sunset clause’ written into the
Hillsborough Agreement, and a proposal is now in place (at the time
of writing, January 2012) that the Alliance Party would continue to
hold the Department of Justice but forfeit its second ministry. The
consequence of this is that the Department of Employment and
Learning, presided over by Alliance’s second minister, Dr Stephen
Farry, will be abolished and its functions transferred to the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment and the Department
of Education, led by a DUP and Sinn Féin minister, respectively. The
Alliance leader reacted angrily to the proposal, arguing that while his
party supports a reduction in the overall size of the executive, ad hoc
changes such as the one proposed are a ‘political carve-up which have
nothing to do with good government’ (Ford, 2012, p. 6). 
The impact
So what have been the impact of the RPA and the lessons learned from
the process? The RPA, from its inception, became inextricably linked
with the wider political developments associated with devolution in
Northern Ireland, itself a product of the Belfast (Good Friday)
Agreement. It has therefore become mired in party politics and, as a
consequence, neither been fully implemented or achieved its potential
‘to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system of public
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Table 1: Number of public bodies pre- and post-RPA
Public Executive Advisory Tribunal Health Public Other Total
bodies NDPB NDPB NDPB and social corpora- bodies
care bodies tions
Pre-RPA 34 16 11 19 1 – 81
Post-RPA 
(March 2011) 48 13 7 13 1 7 89
Sources: Northern Ireland Executive (2005) and OFMDFM (2011).
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administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services’ –
the original goal. Direct rule ministers used the process to attract local
politicians back to the negotiating table when devolution was
suspended. Within key public service areas such as local government
and education, issues such as electoral boundaries and the role of the
churches dominated the outworking of reforms and created long
delays in its implementation. In the one area where the RPA reforms
have been fully implemented, the health sector, an evaluation by the
Northern Ireland Audit Office was underwhelming. A new review of
health and social care has been completed and radical changes
recommended. It has also proved difficult to cut the number of
quangos, so maligned for lacking in accountability and a key target for
the RPA. In short, the RPA became synonymous with the process of
devolution, and its impact is therefore closely linked to how people
perceive the achievements of the assembly. As the First Minister
argued, ‘devolution provides the foundation for peace and prosperity,
but it also allowed us to make a real difference to the people’s
everyday lives’ (Robinson, 2009, p. 1). 
Given this link, an indirect way of assessing the impact of the RPA,
despite its partial implementation, is to examine evidence on what
people think of the achievements of the assembly. Data are available
to do this in the Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys, probability
surveys of approximately 1,200 adults aged eighteen years and over. In
response to the question ‘Overall, do you think that the Northern
Ireland Assembly has achieved a lot, a little or nothing at all?’, on six
occasions from 2002 to 2010 (excluding the periods when the assembly
was suspended) the trend is not particularly encouraging. Around half
of all respondents (Figure 2) considered it to have achieved ‘very little’
(Northern Ireland Life and Times, 2002–10).
Examining the results of the respondents in more detail, it is
interesting to explore whether there are differences of opinion
between groups of respondents on how the assembly has performed.
For example, a priori, one might expect DUP and Sinn Féin
supporters to be more supportive of the achievements of the assembly.
We therefore tested whether perceptions of how the assembly
performed are different according to the respondent’s political
affiliation (or the political party the respondent supported) using data
from the 2010 survey. Using a one-way between-groups analysis of
variance, participants were disaggregated into their support for the
main political parties (DUP, Sinn Féin, Ulster Unionist Party, SDLP
and the Alliance Party). The results show there was no significant
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difference amongst the groups in relation to their opinion on how the
assembly had performed: F (4,817) = 1.15, p > .05 (see Appendix 1).
Hence, regardless of respondents’ party support, the assembly has not
achieved a great deal. 
If perceptions of the assembly are perhaps too crude a surrogate
measure of the impact of the RPA in the absence of any other
available data, then some qualitative assessment of the review is
possible. From the outset the RPA stated that it would be informed by
four fundamental principles: subsidiarity, equality and good relations,
common boundaries and strong local government. If one considers the
proposed role for local government, there will be a marginal change in
the powers of new councils and the potential offered by community
planning and the powers of well-being, which lack detail at this point.
The new functions will require a 25 per cent increase in council
budgets and 12 per cent in council staffing (Northern Ireland Local
Government Association, 2005). This suggests an annual (new)
council expenditure of around £600 million out of a total devolved
budget of £10.3 billion – about 6 per cent of the public purse. Councils
have been offered public realm and roads responsibilities, such as
weed spraying and emptying gullies, hardly the stuff of ‘strong local
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Figure 2: How much has NI Assembly achieved?
Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times (2002–10).
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government’ promised at the outset of the RPA. Local government
will remain, for the foreseeable future, a relatively minor player in the
governance arrangements of Northern Ireland. The asymmetry of
power relationships between Stormont and councils has not shifted as
a result of the RPA. This would suggest that there is neither
subsidiarity nor strong local government.
The original intention of a two-tier model of public administration,
with policy development at the regional tier and service delivery 
at the subregional level (Figure 1 above), was predicated on the idea
of common boundaries for public services to ensure coherence in
provision. In fact, the Police Service of Northern Ireland restructured
their divisional boundaries to coincide with the proposed 
seven-council model, but the new local government structures will
change to eleven councils, and there are now five health trusts. It is
unclear at this point what subdivisions will exist within the 
ESA. Suffice to say that the principle of coterminosity has been
abandoned. 
It is also difficult to see how the principle of equality and good
relations has been promoted through the RPA. In fact, this area has
proved to be highly contentious at the regional level. Direct rule
ministers developed a document entitled A shared future, which argued
that ‘separate but equal is not an option. Parallel living and the
provision of parallel services are unsustainable both morally and
economically’ (OFMDFM, 2005, p. 15). Sinn Féin criticised the whole
basis of A shared future, claiming that it defined the primary problem
as a lack of tolerance between communities, particularly in socially
deprived areas, rather than tackling disadvantage on the basis of
objective need and addressing structural inequalities. A shared future
absolved the government from any responsibilities and redirected the
problem towards the two main communities, which were ‘blamed’
because they simply could not coexist. A new consultation document
entitled Programme for cohesion, sharing and integration (OFMDFM,
2010), which set out the Northern Ireland Executive’s vision for the
future by challenging the assumption that division and segregation is a
‘normal’ pattern of living, has been no more successful. As one
newspaper editorial described it, ‘the proposed programme suggests
that the Executive has set out to manage, rather than eradicate,
sectarianism’ (‘Opinion’, 2010, p. 10). The RPA has therefore added
no value to promoting the principle of equality and good relations, and
failed to deliver on its core principles of common boundaries,
subsidiarity and strong local government.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, given the links between devolution, the RPA and
proposals to radically overhaul key public services, it was inevitable
that party political considerations would come to dominate what
started out as a rational exercise in administrative reform.
Notwithstanding, it is disappointing that the review process, launched
in June 2002, has not yet been fully implemented ten years on and is
unlikely to complete until 2015. One important observation is that the
RPA is primarily about structural reform. A programme of public
services modernisation is running as an entirely separate exercise in
government departments, involving centralised recruitment, shared
services, technology innovation and upskilling of civil servants. 
The RPA’s entire focus on structural reform, which excluded one of
the most important mechanisms in service delivery (government
departments), would suggest an incomplete job. The fact that political
parties are now calling for a review of civil service departments
substantiates this claim. These structural reforms at local or central
government level have political overtones that appear to have little to
do with whether the new structures are ‘fit for purpose’, but rather the
political control of the new councils and the unravelling of the Belfast
(Good Friday) arrangements, respectively. More generally, politicians
and officials are acutely aware that there is no correlation between
quality public services and electoral accountability in Northern
Ireland. Voting patterns remain firmly sectarian and hence the RPA,
while important, will ultimately present no real electoral threat to
politicians through lack of substantial progress or, at worse, failure to
deliver on its promises.
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Appendix 1: 
How much has the Northern Ireland Assembly achieved by party
affiliation?
Descriptives
Party N Mean Std Std 95% confidence Mini- Maxi-
affiliation deviation error interval for mean mum mum
or support Lower Upper
bound bound
DUP 202 2.7030 0.84104 0.05918 2.5863 2.8197 1.00 4.00
Sinn Féin 129 2.7209 0.95995 0.08452 2.5537 2.8882 1.00 4.00
Ulster 
Unionist 180 2.5833 0.92074 0.06863 2.4479 2.7188 1.00 4.00
SDLP 197 2.7766 0.89833 0.06400 2.6504 2.9029 1.00 4.00
Alliance 114 2.6842 0.84472 0.07912 2.5275 2.8410 1.00 4.00
Total 822 2.6946 0.89276 0.03114 2.6335 2.7558 1.00 4.00
Test of homogeneity of variances
Levene statistic df1 df2 Sig.
1.530 4 817 0.191
ANOVA
Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig.
Between groups 3.671 4 0.918 1.152 0.331
Within groups 650.686 817 0.796
Total 654.356 821
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